FAMILY LAW-EQUITABLE DISTRIBUTION-LICENSE To PRACTICE
MEDICINE MAY BE DEEMED MARITAL PROPERTY SUBJECT To
EQUITABLE DISTRIBUTION-O'Brien v. O'Brien, 66 N.Y.2d 576,

489 N.E.2d 712, 498 N.Y.S.2d 743 (1985).
Historically, property acquired during marriage was distributed upon divorce to the title holding spouse.' The inequities
inherent in this practice, however, prompted courts and legislatures to explore alternative approaches to the apportionment of
marital assets. 2 As a result of the increasing recognition of marriage as an economic partnership, many states have.adopted the
theory of "equitable distribution" of property.3 This approach
entitles each spouse to a share of "marital property"' in propor5
tion to his or her contributions throughout the marriage.
One of the most controversial issues concerning this area of
matrimonial law is whether an educational degree or professional
license, acquired during marriage, may be subject to distribution
upon dissolution of marriage. 6 Most states adopting the equitable distribution approach exclude both degrees and licenses
from the classification of marital property simply because they
lack the traditional attributes of property.7 Such courts have reI Note, New York's Equitable Distribution Law: A SweepingReform, 47 BROOKLYN L.
REV. 67, 70 (1980).
2 See id. at 74-79.
3 Note, Equitable Distributionof Degrees and Licenses: Two Theories Toward Compensating Spousal Contributions,49 BROOKLYN L. REV. 301, 302 (1983). See also Recent Case,
Divorce After ProfessionalSchool: Education and Future Earnings Capacity May Be Marital
Property, 44 Mo. L. REV. 329, 330-31 (1979).
4 Marital property is defined as: "[piroperty purchased by persons while married to each other and which, in some jurisdictions, on dissolution of the marriage
is divided in proportions as the court deems fit." BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY 873
(5th ed. 1979). For New York's statutory definition of marital property, see infra
note 28.
5 See Note, supra note 1, at 72.
6 See, e.g., Hughes v. Hughes, 438 So.2d 146, 150 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983)
(spouse's bachelor of science degrees not property subject to distribution); Leveck
v. Leveck, 614 S.W.2d 710, 712 (Ky. Ct. App. 1981) (medical license not marital
property); Mahoney v. Mahoney, 91 N.J. 488, 492, 453 A.2d 527, 529 (1982) (husband's MBA not property subject to equitable distribution); Grosskopf v. Grosskopf, 677 P.2d 814, 822 (Wyo. 1984) (husband's masters degree in accounting not
marital property).
7 See, e.g., Wisner v. Wisner, 129 Ariz. 333, 340, 631 P.2d 115, 122 (Ariz. Ct.
App. 1981) (education an intangible property right not subject to division between
spouses); In re Marriage of Goldstein, 97 Ill. App. 3d 1023, 1027-28, 423 N.E.2d
1201, 1204 (App. Ct. 1981) (speculative earnings potential of medical degree not
marital property); Conner v. Conner, 97 A.D.2d 88, 93, 468 N.Y.S.2d 482, 486-87
(App. Div. 1983) (academic degree not "res susceptible of actual or constructive
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sisted classifying degrees or licenses as property, reasoning that
as representatives of intellectual achievement, they merely provide potential for assistance in future acquisition of property.8
The New York Court of Appeals' landmark decision in O'Brien v.
O'Brien9 discarded traditional property concepts in holding that a
professional degree to practice medicine, acquired during marriage, may be deemed marital property subject to equitable
distribution.' 0
Loretta and Michael O'Brien were both teachers at the same
parochial school when they were married in April 1971.11 At that
time, Loretta possessed a bachelor's degree but needed eighteen
months of post graduate studies to secure permanent teaching
certification in New York.12 Michael was in the process of acquiring his bachelor's degree and completing certain pre-medical
courses in pursuit of his plans to attend medical school.'" The
couple left for Guadalajara, Mexico in September 1973 where
14
they lived for three years while Michael studied medicine.
While in Mexico, Loretta worked continuously, holding as many
as three teaching jobs at one time.' 5 Loretta contributed the income earned from these positions to pay the couple's joint expossession of transfer."); Lesman v. Lesman, 88 A.D.2d 153, 157, 452 N.Y.S.2d
935, 938 (App. Div. 1982) (medical license not within traditional concepts of
property).
8 In re Marriage of Graham, 194 Colo. 429, 432, 574 P.2d 75, 77 (1978). The
Supreme Court of Colorado observed that neither a professional education, degree, nor license has:
an exchange value or any objective transferable value on an open market. It is personal to the holder. It terminates on death of the holder
and is not inheritable. It cannot be assigned, sold, transferred, conveyed or pledged. An advanced degree is a cumulative product of many
years of previous education, combined with diligence and hard work. It
may not be acquired by the mere expenditure of money. It is simply an
intellectual achievement that may potentially assist in the future acquisition of property... it has none of the attributes of property in the usual
sense of that term.
Id.
9 66 N.Y.2d 576, 489 N.E.2d 712, 498 N.Y.S.2d 743 (1985).
10 Id. at 590, 489 N.E.2d at 720, 498 N.Y.S.2d at 751.
I' Id. at 581, 489 N.E.2d at 713, 498 N.Y.S.2d at 744.
12

Id.

Id., 489 N.E.2d at 714, 498 N.Y.S.2d at 745. Shortly after the marriage,
Michael returned to school at night to obtain his undergraduate degree. Id. Thereafter, Michael left his teaching position in order to fulfill a year of required
premedical courses. O'Brien v. O'Brien, 106 A.D.2d 223, 234, 45 N.Y.S.2d 548,
556 (App. Div. 1985) (Thompson, J.P., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
14 O'Brien, 66 N.Y.2d at 581, 489 N.E.2d at 714, 498 N.Y.S.2d at 745.
'50'Brien
v. O'Brien, 114 Misc. 2d 233, 234, 452 N.Y.S.2d 801, 802 (Sup. Ct.
1982).
13
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penses.' 6 In December 1976, Michael and Loretta returned to
New York where Michael completed his final two semesters of
medical school and then began his training as an intern.' 7
Loretta resumed the teaching position she formerly held and
continued to contribute her earnings to the joint support of the
couple.'" In October 1980, Michael became licensed to practice
medicine.' 9 Two months later he instituted an action for
20
divorce.

Upon the couple's divorce, the issue concerning distribution
of marital assets needed to be decided. 2 ' Other than Michael's
medical license, the parties acquired no assets of significant value
during their nine year marriage.2 2 Loretta, therefore, sought to
have Michael's license to practice medicine declared marital
property.23
The trial court held that Michael's medical license was marital property and, as such, subject to equitable distribution. 24 Accordingly, Loretta was awarded $188,800, representing forty
percent of the medical license's present value. 5 The trial court's
ruling recognized that the laws governing distribution of prop16 Id. While the parties were not in agreement as to the amount of their financial
contributions to their marital expenses, it was nevertheless undisputed that Loretta,
in addition to managing the household and the family finances, was gainfully employed for the duration of the marriage. O'Brien, 66 N.Y.2d at 581, 489 N.E.2d at
714, 498 N.Y.S.2d at 745. The trial court held Loretta's financial contributions to
be 76% of the couple's expenses; exclusive of a $10,000 student loan acquired by
Michael. Id. at 581-82, 489 N.E.2d at 714, 498 N.Y.S.2d at 745.
17 Id. at 581, 489 N.E.2d at 714, 498 N.Y.S.2d at 745.
18 Id. Loretta testified that had she earned additional credits necessary to secure
permanent teaching certification, she would have been entitled to double her teaching salary. O'Brien v. O'Brien, 106 A.D.2d 223, 234, 435 N.Y.S.2d 548, 556 (App.
Div. 1985) (Thompson, J. P., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
19 O'Brien, 66 N.Y.2d at 581, 489 N.E.2d at 714, 498 N.Y.S.2d at 745.
20 Id. Originally, Michael sought a divorce from Loretta "on the grounds of
cruel and inhuman treatment and constructive abandonment." O'Brien, 114
Misc.2d at 235, 452 N.Y.S.2d at 802. In her answer to Michael's complaint, Loretta
counterclaimed on grounds of cruelty, seeking, inter alia, equitable distribution of
their marital property. Id. Michael filed a reply to Loretta's counterclaim but eventually withdrew his complaint and Loretta "was granted an uncontested divorce on
the grounds of constructive abandonment." Id.

21

Id.

Id. at 235, 452 N.Y.S.2d at 802-03.
23 See id. at 233, 452 N.Y.S.2d 802.
24 Id. at 239, 452 N.Y.S.2d at 805. It should be noted that although the trial
court classified both the medical degree and license as marital property, the opinion
of the Supreme Court, Appellate Division focused solely upon the medical license,
O'Brien, 106 A.D.2d at 224, 485 N.Y.S.2d at 549, as did the Court of Appeals of
New York. O'Brien, 66 N.Y.2d at 580, 489 N.E.2d at 713, 498 N.Y.S.2d at 744.
25 See O'Brien, 114 Misc.2d at 241, 452 N.Y.S.2d at 806.
22
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erty subsequent to divorce had recently undergone profound
change with the passage of New York's equitable distribution
law.2 6 Justice Daronco, writing for the court, noted that the legislature, by introducing the concept of equitable distribution, cast
aside traditional concepts of property and "infused flexibility... in the measurement of the rights and obligations of family
members upon dissolution of the family unit."' 27 The trial court
further noted that the equitable distribution statute equates
"marital partners" with "economic partners" and defines marital
property to include all property acquired by either partner during the marriage without regard to the source of the asset.2 8 In

its ruling, the trial court weighed the following factors: Loretta's
Id. at 237, 452 N.Y.S.2d at 804.
Id. at 238, 452 N.Y.S.2d at 804.
Id. at 237-38, 452 N.Y.S.2d at 804-05. The relevant sections of the reformed
New York Domestic Relations Law are as follows:
1. Definitions....
1-c. The term "marital property" shall mean all property acquired by
either or both spouses during the marriage and before the execution of
a separation agreement or the commencement of a matrimonial action,
regardless of the form in which title is held, except as otherwise provided in agreement pursuant to subdivision three of this part. Marital
property shall not include separate property as hereinafter defined.
26
27
28

5. Disposition of property in certain matrimonial actions.
a. Except where the parties have provided in an agreement for the disposition of their property pursuant to subdivision three of this part, the
court, in an action wherein all or part of the relief granted is divorce, or
the dissolution, annulment or declaration of the nullity of a marriage,
and in proceedings to obtain a distribution of marital property following
a foreign judgment of divorce, shall determine the respective rights of
the parties in their separate or marital property, and shall provide for
the disposition thereof in the final judgment.
b. Separate property shall remain such.
c. Marital property shall be distributed equitably between the parties, considering the circumstances of the case and of the respective parties.
d. In determining an equitable distribution of property under paragraph c, the court shall consider:
(1) the income and the property of each party at the time of marriage, and at the time of the commencement of the action;
(2) the duration of the marriage and the age and health of both
parties;
(3) the need of a custodial parent to occupy or own the marital
residence and to use or own its household effects;
(4) the loss of inheritance and pension rights upon dissolution of
the marriage as of the date of dissolution;
(5) any award of maintenance under subdivision six of this part;
(6) any equitable claim to, interest in, or direct or indirect contribution made to the acquisition of such marital property by the party not
having title, including joint efforts or expenditures and contributions
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substantial monetary contributions to Michael's education, the
breakdown of the marriage shortly after the completion of
Michael's schooling, and the fact that the only asset of any significant value acquired during the marriage was the medical
license.29
On appeal, the supreme court, appellate division, reversed
the lower court's holding that a professional license is marital
property.30 The court reasoned that neither the equitable distribution law nor its legislative history relayed any intent "to vest a
proprietary right in one spouse to the other.spouse's very person."' Additionally, the court observed that the trial court's distinction between a college degree and a professional license was
not in accordance with prior case law.3 2 The court further cautioned that fixing a professional degree as property opens up the
possibility of attachment of creditors' liens, a proposition which
would yield "indescribable mischief."'3 3

On cross appeals, the

and services as a spouse, parent, wage earner and homemaker, and to
the career or career potential of the other party;
(7) the liquid or non-liquid character of all martial property;
(8) the probable future financial circumstances of each party;
(9) the impossibility or difficulty of evaluating any component asset or any interest in a business, corporation or profession, and the economic desirability of retaining such asset or interest intact and free from
any claim or interference by the other party;...
(10) any other factor which the court shall expressly find to be just
and proper.
N.Y. DoM. REL. LAw § 236 (B) (McKinney Supp. 1980-81).
29 O'Brien, 114 Misc.2d at 236, 452 N.Y.S.2d at 803.
30 See O'Brien, 106 A.D.2d at 225, 485 N.Y.S.2d at 550.
3' Id. at 226, 485 N.Y.S.2d at 550. The appellate division stressed the distinction between basic obligations, such as the transfer of marital property, and the
grant to one spouse of a percentage of the other spouse's future labors. Id. at 227,
485 N.Y.S.2d at 551. The court reasoned that such an interest in future labors is
tantamount to ownership in part by a former spouse, herein accomplished "by the
fictional partition of the res of [the husband's medical] license." Id.
32 See id. Throughout its opinion, the trial court made no distinction in utilizing
the terms "degree" and "license." O'Brien, 114 Misc.2d at 240, 452 N.Y.S.2d at
805.
33 O'Brien, 106 A.D.2d at 227, 485 N.Y.S.2d at 551. In a lengthy dissent, Justice
Thompson expressed approval of the trial court's opinion which treated Michael's
medical license as marital property. Id. at 233, 485 N.Y.S.2d at 556 (Thompson,
J.P., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Justice Thompson,joined by Justice
Weinstein, considered the trial court's opinion to be a simple facilitation of "the
legislative intent underlying the enactment of Domestic Relations Law
§ 236[BI[1][c] ..
" Id. In recognizing that marital property "is a purely statutory
creation," the dissent noted that sole reliance upon conventional property concepts
"is unnecessary and unrealistic." Id. at 237, 485 N.Y.S.2d at 558 (Thompson, J.P.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part).
The dissenting Justices expressed reservations over the speculative and restric-

968

SETON HALL LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 17:963

Court of Appeals of New York reversed the appellate division,
holding that a license to practice medicine, acquired during marriage, may be marital property subject to equitable distribution.3 4
Thus, the court ruled that the contributing spouse may be entitled to an equitable portion of the license, not merely a return of
funds advanced.3 5
For generations, division of marital property in New York
and elsewhere was governed by a common-law title theory.3 6
Upon dissolution of the marriage, a spouse would retain only
that property which was held solely in his or her individual
name.3 ' This practice typically resulted in distribution of most
marital property to the husband upon divorce, leaving virtually
no substantial assets to the wife.38 In response to the disparity
implicit in the common-law approach, the New York Legislature
enacted an equitable distribution statute in 1980 that was hertive aspects of an award based upon future earnings. Id. The Justices noted that
monetary restraints imposed on a professional by a distributive award effectively
eliminate the option of pursuing less financially rewarding occupations. Id. Despite their recognition of the problems inherent in distributive awards of this type,
however, the dissent asserted that "the dilemma should be dealt with as a valuation
problem and should not serve as a basis for erasing a substantive right." Id.
34 O'Brien, 66 N.Y.2d at 590, 489 N.E.2d at 719-20, 498 N.Y.S.2d at 750-51. The
court of appeals further held that there was no indication of fault on Loretta's part
sufficient to "shock the conscience of the court" as required in order for fault to be
a consideration in equitable distribution. Id. at 589-90, 489 N.E.2d at 719, 498
N.Y.S.2d at 750-51.
The court of appeals also ruled that the appellate division did not abuse its
discretion in affirming the trial court's grant of counsel fees to Loretta. Id. at 590,
489 N.E.2d at 719, 498 N.Y.S.2d at 750. In addressing the appellate division's decision to delete the expert fee award, the court of appeals remanded the issue in
light of its determination that Michael's medical license constituted marital property. Id. at 590, 489 N.E.2d at 719-20, 498 N.Y.S.2d at 750-51.
35 Id. at 587-88, 489 N.E.2d at 719, 498 N.Y.S.2d at 749.
36 N.Y. Dom. REL. LAw § 234(B) (McKinney Supp. 1986) (Scheinkman, 1982
Practice Commentary at 40) ("Until the enactment of the Equitable Distribution
Law New York was a 'title' state in which the court was required to award title to
property to the spouse who was entitled to it by ordinary property principles.")
37 See Note, supta note 1, at 75. Prior to reform of the New York Domestic Relations Law, the husband, as title-holder, typically retained ownership to most of the
parties' assets while the wife "upon divorce acquired no rights in any of the property in recognition of her contributions as homemaker, [and] was forced to rely on
alimony as her sole means of support." Id. See Weltz v. Weltz, 35 A.D.2d 208, 210,
315 N.Y.S.2d 150, 152 (App. Div. 1970) (husband, as title-holder to cooperative
apartment, had exclusive right to reside there).
38 DiLeo and Model, A Survey of the Law of Property Disposition In the Tristate Area,
56 ST. JOHN's L. REv. 219, 220 n.2 (1982) ("New York courts were powerless to
transfer property to which one spouse held title unless the spouse seeking apportionment satisfied the requirement for the imposition of a constructive trust.") (citing Fischer v. Wirth, 38 A.D.2d 611, 611-12, 326 N.Y.S.2d 308, 309-10 (App. Div.
1971).
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aided as a sweeping reform of the state's divorce laws. 3 9 The
statute, as revised, provided for the equitable distribution of marital property-which was defined as including "all property acquired
by
either
or
both
spouses
during
the
marriage.. .regardless of the form in which title is held."' 40 This
law embodied the contemporary notion that the marital relationship is an economic partnership that upon dissolution requires "a
winding up of the parties' economic affairs and a severance of
their economic
ties by an equitable distribution of the marital
41
assets."
Following the enactment of the 1980 statute, considerable
litigation ensued with respect to the precise definition of marital
property. 42 Inevitably, the issue arose as to whether an educational degree or professional license was intended by the legislature to be included as marital property for distribution within the
mandates of the reformed matrimonial law.43 In attempting to
resolve this exceedingly controversial question, New York courts
initially relied on traditional property concepts for interpretive
guidance.44
Within a year of the 1980 reform, the question of whether
the newly acquired medical license of a doctor could be considered marital property was addressed in Lesman v. Lesman.45 At the
39 Governor's Memorandum on Approval of ch. 281, (June 19, 1980), reprintedin

1980 N.Y. Laws 1863.
40 N.Y. DoM. REL. LAW § 236(B)(1)(b) (McKinney Supp. 1980-81). See also Foster, Commentary On Equitable Distribution, 26 NEW YORK L. SCH. L. REV. 1, 8 (1981)
("The definition of martial property which makes title ownership irrelevant is perhaps the major reform of the new law for, prior to its enactment, New York was one
of the six 'title' states ..
").
41 O'Brien, 66 N.Y.2d at 585, 489 N.E.2d at 716, 498 N.Y.S.2d at 747.
42 See, e.g., Majauskas v. Majauskas, 61 N.Y.2d 481, 463 N.E.2d 15, 474 N.Y.S.2d
699 (1984) (present value of vested rights in noncontributory pension plan found
to be marital property subject to equitable distribution); Wood v. Wood, 119
Misc.2d 1076, 465 N.Y.S.2d 475 (Sup. Ct. 1983) (appreciation of separate assets
during marriage is marital property); Nehorayoff v. Nehorayoff, 108 Misc.2d 311,
437 N.Y.S.2d 584 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1981) (husband's interest in closely-held corporation found to be distributable marital property).
43 Lesman v. Lesman, 110 Misc. 2d 815, 442 N.Y.S.2d 955 (Sup. Ct. 1981), modified and aff'd, 88 A.D.2d 153, 452 N.Y.S.2d 935 (App. Div.), appeal dismissed, 57
N.Y.2d 956 (1982) (license to practice medicine).
44 See infra notes 45-54 and accompanying text.
45 110 Misc.2d 815, 442 N.Y.S.2d 955 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1981). The facts of Lesman
are substantially similar to those in O'Brien in that the parties were married in New
York in 1971 and left for Guadalajara, Mexico shortly thereafter, where the husband studied medicine for three and a half years. Lesman v. Lesman, 88 A.D.2d at
154, 452 N.Y.S.2d at 936 (App. Div. 1982), appeal dismissed, 57 N.Y.2d 956 (1982).
Significantly, however, Mrs. Lesman was not employed throughout this time pe-
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trial level, the Lesman court concluded that a doctor's license to
practice medicine has "no monetary value per se," is not a salable commodity, and is completely valueless to anyone other than
its holder.4 6 The court noted, instead, that the increased earnings the license afforded its holder translated, upon divorce, into
larger maintenance and support payments to the non-licensed
spouse.4 7 Accordingly, the license was held not to be property
subject to equitable distribution.48
The trial court's ruling was affirmed by the appellate division, where once again, traditional property concepts provided
the basis for excluding professional degrees from the classification of marital property.49 The appellate division in Lesman
found it significant that neither professional licenses nor educational degrees carry an exchange or transfer value on the open
market, are not inheritable and terminate upon the holder's
death.50 Moreover, the court noted that both are incapable of
assignment, sale, transferral, or conveyance and may not be acquired simply in exchange for money.5 1 The court further noted
that because these intellectual achievements merely contribute to
the potential for future property acquisitions, they do not carry
familiar attributes of property.5 2 The Lesman court observed that
the classification of an education or a degree as property also has
the effect of treating future earning capacity, an unvested right,
as property.53 In a final note of caution, the Lesman court focused
on the potential for flagrant inequities which would result from a
distribution awarded on the basis of "speculative expectation of
enhanced future earnings" which, unlike maintenance awards,
are not modifiable "to meet future realities. 54
riod. Lesman, 88 A.D.2d at 154, 452 N.Y.S.2d at 936-37. Upon returning to New
York, Mrs. Lesman earned a small weekly salary which was not applied toward her
husband's expenses. Id.
46 Lesman, 110 Misc. 2d at 816, 442 N.Y.S.2d at 957.
47 Id. at 817, 442 N.Y.S.2d at 957.
48 Id.
49 Lesman, 88 A.D.2d at 157, 452 N.Y.S.2d at 938. In affirming Lesman, the appellate court acknowledged the Supreme Court of Westchester County's recent decision in O'Brien which held that "a medical education is property subject to
equitable distribution." Id. at 155 n.1, 452 N.Y.S.2d at 937 n.1.
50 Id. at 157, 452 N.Y.S.2d at 938 (quoting In re Marriage of Graham, 194 Colo.
429, 432, 574 P.2d, 75, 77 (1978)).
51 Id.
52 Id.
53 See id.
54 Id.
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In Litman v. Litman, 5 5 however, the New York Supreme Court

Appellate Division, in deciding whether a law practice was marital
property, gave little effect to traditional property concepts. 56
Rather, the Litman court focused on the New York Domestic Relations Law's language relevant to marital property and its distribution.57 The Litman court acknowledged that the legislature's
enactment of the equitable distribution law was in recognition of
marriage as an economic partnership. 58 The court noted that the
amended statute mandated distribution of property accumulated
during marriage in accordance with the parties' individual needs
and circumstances. 59 In conformance with this goal, the legislature fashioned the "distributive award" 60 to accommodate circumstances where an actual division of marital assets between
spouses is "impracticable, impossible or illegal."'' 6 Relying on
the statutory language, the Litman court asserted that the distributive award is intended to be invoked where marital assets are so
intertwined with a spouse's very livelihood that they are incapable of undergoing veritable distribution. 62 Thus, despite the inherent difficulty of valuing a law practice, the Litman court, in
"the face of the clear intent of the Legislature," held that a law
practice was an appropriate target for a distributive award. 63
In contrast, the New York Appellate Division in Conner v.
Conner6 refused to treat an academic degree as property subject
to equitable distribution. 65 The Conner court discussed exten55 93 A.D.2d 695, 463 N.Y.S.2d 24 (App. Div. 1983), aff'd, 61 N.Y.2d 918, 463

N.E.2d 34, 474 N.Y.S.2d 718 (1984).
56 Id. at 696, 463 N.Y.S.2d at 25.
57
58

Id.
Id.

59

Id.

"Distributive award" is defined as:
payments provided for in a valid agreement between the parties or
awarded by the court, in lieu of or to supplement, facilitate or effectuate
the division or distribution of property where authorized in a matrimonial action, and payable either in a lump sum or over a period of time in
fixed amounts. Distributive awards shall not include payments which
are treated as ordinary income to the recipient under the provisions of
the United States Internal Revenue Code.
N.Y. DoM. REL. Law § 236(B)(1)(b) (McKinney Supp. 1980-81).
61 Litman, 93 A.D.2d at 696, 463 N.Y.S.2d at 25 (citation omitted).
62 See id.
63 Id.
64 97 A.D.2d 88, 468 N.Y.S.2d 482 (App. Div. 1983).
65 Id. at 89, 468 N.Y.S.2d at 484. In 1971, Robert and Elaine Conner married in
West Germany. Id. Robert was a recently discharged captain in the United States
Army and Elaine was a teacher, holding a master's degree in education. Id. Elaine
worked full time for four years of the six year marriage while her husband attended
60
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sively the reformed matrimonial law's virtues, and lauded its
framers' foresight in conferring flexibility on the courts to establish a form of appropriate compensation to the dependent
spouse in a matrimonial action.66 Nevertheless, the court did not
agree that the statute justified the imposition of a "judgment
debt" upon a percentage of the husband's future earnings, regardless of the extent of his wife's efforts toward attainment of
his degree.67 The Conner court further observed that granting the
wife "a share in her husband's future earnings... on the assumption that he will maximize his potential" would frustrate "the basic assumptions and operation of the Equitable Distribution
Law." 68

A year after Conner, the New York Appellate Division decided
in Cohen v. Cohen 69 that a partnership interest in an accounting
firm was marital property and was a proper subject for a distributive award.7 0 Unlike previous cases concerning whether professional interests constitute marital property, Richard Cohen had
been established professionally at the time of his marriage in
1970. 7 1 Five years later, however, Richard became a partner in a
prestigious accounting firm in which he had accumulated a considerable number of shares of ownership by the time the couple
divorced in 1981 .72 The Cohen court relied upon the Litman decision in holding that Janet Cohen was entitled to fifty percent of
school. Id. During the marriage, Robert earned a bachelor's degree at the University of California at Santa Barbara and two master's degrees, in public administration and business administration, from Harvard University. See id. at 89-90, 468
N.Y.S.2d at 485. In the divorce action, Elaine Conner sought to have Robert's masters degrees declared marital property, since the parties owned no real property or
other assets of substantial value. Id. at 90, 468 N.Y.S.2d at 485.
66 Id. at 100-01, 468 N.Y.S.2d at 491-92.
67 Id. at 102, 468 N.Y.S.2d at 492.
68 Id. In concluding that Robert Conner's academic degree was not marital
property subject to distribution, the Conner court emphasized:
there is no authority in the Equitable Distribution Law to impose upon
her husband ajudgment debt-not merely a support obligation-of half
or some other percentage of the present value of his future services
under the degree, no matter how much his skills have been enhanced by
her efforts during their marriage.
Id.
69 104 A.D.2d 841, 480 N.Y.S.2d 358 (App. Div. 1984), appeal dismissed, 64
N.Y.2d 773, 475 N.E.2d 457 (1985).
70 Id. at 842, 480 N.Y.S.2d at 361.
71 Id. at 843, 480 N.Y.S.2d at 361. It should be noted that Richard's interest in
the accounting firm was not the Conner's sole distributable asset. At the time of
divorce, the Cohen's home in Scardale, New York was among their accumulated
marital assets. Id. at 842, 480 N.Y.S.2d at 360.
72 Id. at 843, 480 N.Y.S.2d at 361.
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her husband's partnership interest acquired during the marriage.73 This award was deemed particularly appropriate in light
of the considerable contributions she made to the marriage in
her dual capacities as wage earner and homemaker for their
family.74
Notwithstanding the language set forth in the equitable distribution law, New York's lower courts continued to be embroiled in disputes as to whether intangibles such as professional
licenses, educational degrees, and business interests constituted
marital property.75 The apparent contradiction between the Lesman and Litman rulings encouraged confusion and a wealth of
ambivalence in instances concerning distribution of intangible
assets.76 With no consistent case law to serve as guidance in
resolving this exceedingly controversial question, the O'Brien
case was appealed to New York's highest court.77
The O'Brien majority began its analysis by noting that the
Domestic Relations Law is predicated upon the notion that
spouses acquire an equitable interest in "things of value" accumulated during the marriage. 7' The court further recognized
that the New York Legislature deliberately overstepped traditional property notions by broadly defining marital property to
include " 'all property acquired by either or both spouses during
the marriage... regardless of the form in which title is held'. ' 7 9 In deferring to the statute's language, the court of appeals rejected
73 Id. at 842-43, 480 N.Y.S.2d at 361.
74

Id. at 843, 480 N.Y.S.2d at 361.

75 See generally Note, Property Distribution in Domestic Relations Law: A Proposalfor

Excluding Educational Degrees and Professional Licenses from the Marital Estate, 11 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1327, 1330, 1341 (1983) (noting lack of uniformity among courts deciding whether intangibles are marital property).
76 See Kutanovski v. Kutanovski, 109 A.D.2d 822, 486 N.Y.S.2d 338 (Sup. Ct.
1985), rev'd, 120 A.D.2d 571, 502 N.Y.S.2d 218 (App. Div. 1986). In Kutanovski, the
appellate division held that the lower court erred in ruling that a license to practice
medicine was marital property. Id. at 824, 486 N.Y.S.2d at 339. The Kutanovski
court, relying upon the O'Brien appellate decision as well as both Conner and Lesman,
determined that a distributive award to Mrs. Kutanovski for ten percent of the projected value of her husband's medical license over ten years was improper. Id. at
823-24, 486 N.Y.S.2d at 339. The original distributive award, however, was later
reinstated in 1986 "[i]n light of the Court of Appeals' recent determination [in the
O'Brien case] that a license to practice medicine obtained by one partner during
marriage is marital property." Kutanovski v. Kutanovski, 120 A.D.2d 571, 572, 502
N.Y.S.2d 218, 219 (App. Div. 1986).
77 O'Brien, 66 N.Y.2d 576, 489 N.E.2d 712, 498 N.Y.S.2d 743.
78 Id. at 583, 489 N.E.2d at 715, 498 N.Y.S.2d at 746.
79 Id. (quoting N.Y. DOM. REL. LAw § 236(B)(l)(c),(d) (McKinney Supp. 198081)).
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Michael O'Brien's argument that his license was merely representative of his potential for future earnings.8 s Judge Simons,
writing for the majority, noted that marital property is a unique
"'statutory creature [having] no meaning whatsoever during the
normal course of the marriage and arises full-grown, like Athena,
upon the signing of a separation agreement or the commencement of a matrimonial action.' "81 Consequently, the court concluded that it was completely irrelevant that traditional common
law property notions are not consonant with the innovative concept known as marital property.8 2
Focusing on the language of the Domestic Relations Law,
the O'Brien court held that a spouse's "interest in a profession or
professional career potential is marital property. '8 3 The court
observed that such an interest exists whether it is manifested by
direct or indirect contributions from the non title-holding spouse
and may include intangible contributions made incident to the
role of a homemaker.8 4 Judge Simons commented that few endeavors occur during a marriage which better exemplify the kind
of united effort for which the statute's economic partnership theory was intended to apply than the joint contributions made in
pursuit of one spouse's attainment of a professional license. 8
The court of appeals interpreted the legislature's express reference to contributions by one spouse to the other spouse's profession or career potential as an acknowledgment that such
contributions represent investments in the marital partnership.8 6
80 See id. Michael O'Brien relied primarily upon cases from other jurisdictions in
support of the theory that his medical license should not be considered marital
property, and he further asserted that a license is not consistent with common law
property concepts. Id. These arguments were refuted as the court of appeals noted
that the language of each state's particular statute, along with its legislative history,
controls for purposes of interpreting the boundaries of "marital property." Id.
81 Id. (quoting Florescue, "Market Value", ProfessionalLicenses and MaritalProperty:
A Dilemma in Search of a Horn, 1982 N.Y. ST. B.A. FAM. L. REV. 13).
82 Id. (citation omitted).
83 Id. at 584, 489 N.E.2d at 716, 498 N.Y.S.2d at 747.
84 Id. The O'Brien court noted that:
[w]orking spouses are often required to contribute substantial income
as wage earners, sacrifice their own educational or career goals and opportunities for child rearing, perform the bulk of household duties and
responsibilities and forego the acquisition of marital assets that could
have been accumulated if the professional spouse had been employed
rather than occupied with the study and training necessary to acquire a
professional license.
ld. at 585, 489 N.E.2d at 716, 498 N.Y.S.2d at 747.
85 ld.
86 Id. at 585-86, 489 N.E.2d at 716, 498 N.Y.S.2d at 747.
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Accordingly, the court reasoned that a professional license, as a
product of the parties' joint efforts, is rightfully classified as marital property. 87
The majority asserted that the appellate division's holding
erroneously limited the statute's application solely to established
professional practices, and rendered unaffected a license held by
a novice professional.88 Judge Simons could fathom no reason to
confine the statute's language exclusively to existing practices
since such a limitation would affect a distributive award for valuation purposes only.89
The court of appeals further rejected the appellate court's
reasoning that Michael's license was not marital property because
the license had no exchange value, and was incapable of sale, assignment, or transfer.9" The O'Brien court faulted the appellate
court's reasoning on two bases.9 First, it disregarded the fact
that, regardless of traditional property notions, the question of
whether a professional license constitutes marital property is
governed by the statute's language.9 2 Second, the court of appeals posited that a professional license could warrant consideration as property even outside the statute's context.93 Judge
Simons noted that a professional license, by its very nature, is
clearly a valuable property right that may only be revoked when
subjected to the mandates of due process.94 Therefore, the
Judge concluded that the absence of traditional attributes of
property is irrelevant to the classification of a professional license
as marital property pursuant to the statutory definition.95
The majority dismissed Michael's suggestion that alternative
remedies, such as a rehabilitative maintenance award or reimId. at 586, 489 N.E.2d at 717, 498 N.Y.S.2d at 748.
88 Id. at 586, 489 N.E.2d at 716-17, 498 N.Y.S.2d at 747-48. The court noted
that the appellate division held the relevant provisions of the Domestic Relations
Law were not applicable to the "license held by a professional who has yet to establish a practice but only to a going professional practice." Id., 489 N.E.2d at 716,
498 N.Y.S.2d at 747.
89 Id., 489 N.E.2d at 717, 498 N.Y.S.2d at 748.
90 Id.
91 Id.
92 Id. The O'Brien court accordingly held that it is of no consequence that the
license's basic characteristics depart from traditional property concepts. Id.
93 Id.
94 Id. See also Bender v. Board of Regents, 262 A.D. 627, 631, 30 N.Y.S.2d 779,
784 (App. Div. 1941) ("The right to practice dentistry is, like the right to practice
any other profession, a valuable property right, in which, under the Constitution
and laws of the State, one is entitled to be protected and secured.").
95 O'Brien, 66 N.Y.2d at 586, 489 N.E.2d at 717, 498 N.Y.S.2d at 748.
87
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bursement for direct monetary contributions, was inconsistent
with the notion of an economic partnership implicit in the statute.9 6 The court reasoned that such measures would retain the
undesirable ties of dependence and defeat the underlying purposes of equity and independence 'the legislature had sought to
achieve through the introduction of equitable distribution.97 In
recognizing that maintenance may be subject to termination
upon the recipient's remarriage, the majority observed that a non
title-holding spouse may never receive adequate compensation
for the contributions he or she made and would effectively be
penalized for choosing to remarry.98 While acknowledging the
obstacles inherent in valuation, the court nevertheless commented that valuing a professional license would be no more difficult than computing tort damages. 99
In his concurrence, Judge Meyer expressed concern over the
potential inequity implicit in the distributive award of a professional license made while its holder is still in the formative stages
of his profession. t ' The Judge noted that while an equity court
normally is empowered with the right to alter a child support or
maintenance award where circumstances warrant modification,
the Domestic Relations Law, however, implies that a distributive
award may not undergo subsequent alteration.' O' Of particular
96 Id. at 587, 489 N.E.2d at 717, 498 N.Y.S.2d at 748.
97 Id.
98 Id.

The O'Brien court borrowed from language used by the court in Wood v.
Wood, 119 Misc.2d 1076, 465 N.Y.S.2d 475 (Sup. Ct. 1983), which observed that
the goal of equitable distribution focuses on the recognition that upon termination
of marriage, both spouses are entitled to share in the marital assets accumulated
throughout its duration because they represent " 'the capital product of what was
essentially a partnership entity.' " O'Brien, 66 N.Y.2d at 587, 489 N.E.2d at 717, 498
N.Y.S.2d at 748 (quoting Wood, 119 Misc.2d at 1079, 465 N.Y.S.2d at 477).
99 O'Brien, 66 N.Y.2d at 588, 489 N.E.2d at 718, 498 N.Y.S.2d at 749. The
O'Brien court explained that while valuation is difficult, computation of such awards
does not differ from fashioning tort damages in wrongful death cases or calculating
diminished earning capacity resulting from injury. Id. Valuing a license, the O'Brien
court asserted, poses problems different only in degree from those presented in
valuing professional practices for distributive awards. Id. See, e.g., Arvantides v.
Arvantides, 64 N.Y.2d 1033, 478 N.E.2d 199, 489 N.Y.S.2d 58 (1985) (husband's
dental practice valued for purposes of distributive award); Billington v. Billington,
111 A.D.2d 203, 489 N.Y.S.2d 89 (App. Div. 1985) (wife permitted expert's fees for
purposes of calculating value of husband's medical practice). See also Nehorayoff v.
Nehorayoff, 108 Misc.2d 311, 437 N.Y.S.2d 584 (Sup. Ct. 1981) (husband's interest
in closely-held corporation valued by capitalizing net earnings).
100 O'Brien, 66 N.Y.2d at 591, 489 N.E.2d at 720, 498 N.Y.S.2d at 751 (Meyer, J,
concurring).
101 Id. (citing People v. Scanlon, 11 N.Y.2d 459, 462, 184 N.E.2d 302, 303, 230
N.Y.S.2d 708, 709 (1962)).
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concern to Judge Meyer was the manner in which to avoid the
situation where a professional still in training, yet not committed
to a career choice, "may be locked into a particular kind of practice simply because the monetary obligations imposed by
the dis10 2
tributive award... leaves him or her no alternative."'
Judge Meyer commented that since the expert's valuation is
admittedly based upon a considerable degree of speculation,
projections range from whether Dr. O'Brien will earn what the
average
surgeon earns to whether he will live to the age of sixtyfive.' 03 Judge Meyer averred that the equitable distribution provision of the reformed divorce law was intended to infuse flexibility. 10 Accordingly, the Judge urged that where assumptions as
to one's professional success prove incorrect, it should be possible for courts to revise distributive awards consistent with
the pli0 5
ancy afforded child support and maintenance decrees.1
The O'Brien decision displays a radical departure from traditional reasoning and demonstrates a strong commitment by New
York's highest court to construe the State's Domestic Relations
Law in accordance with its original purpose.'0 6 The major thrust
of the O'Brien holding centers on the notion that "marital property" is a recent statutory creation which completely departs
from established common law property concepts. 0 7 The statutory definition of marital property, therefore, was properly
granted deference by the Court of Appeals in its conclusion that
the legislature intended professional licenses to be included as
distributable marital property. 0
One problem with apportioning a professional license pursuant to a monetary distributive award, as mentioned in the concurrence, stems from the concept of irrevocable finality implicit
in such awards. This characteristic presents a serious question as
to whether the distribution is in fact "equitable" at all. The atId.
Id. at 591-92, 489 N.E.2d at 720, 498 N.Y.S.2d at 751 (Meyer, J., concurring).
When questioned as to whether his valuation of the medical license was speculative
in nature, Loretta's expert candidly admitted that his assumptions and calculations
necessarily included a degree of conjecture. Id.
104 Id. at 592, 489 N.E.2d at 720, 498 N.Y.S.2d at 751 (Meyer, J., concurring).
105 Id. Judge Meyer asserted that the right to reconsideration of an award would
not be abused due to fabricated cases since a nonlicensed spouse would be able to
seek reinstatement of the original award plus counsel fees should the alleged circumstances upon which an award is based turns out to have been "illusory or
feigned." Id., 489 N.E.2d at 721, 498 N.Y.S.2d at 752 (Meyer, J., concurring).
106 See id. at 583, 489 N.E.2d at 715, 498 N.Y.S.2d at 746.
107 Id.
108 Id.
102
103
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tendant problems with valuation pose a veritable obstacle course
in the path of achieving genuine equity in distributions of marital
assets. 0 9 The future of a professional on the threshold of his
career is at best nebulous, and in the worst scenario, wrought
with uncharted woes which may seriously impede satisfaction
pursuant to a distributive award. Since the distribution of a
newly acquired license is "predicated upon the unknown", tany
estimation as to its present value is purely speculative and, as
such, susceptible to a tremendous margin of error. The award
assumes that the professional license or degree holding spouse
will either maximize his potential or achieve a level of financial
success commensurate with the "average" person in his field."'
Although "average" as the basic measurement purports to be
both a conservative and equitable point of reference, such a standard becomes manifestly unfair to roughly half of the professionals who are neither at the median nor "above average." Basing a
distributive award on such an imprecise standard fosters inequity
and places an overwhelming burden on the novice professional
whose career future remains essentially hazy.' 2
Further, the statute as written invites creative maneuvering
on the part of a professional for whom the conclusion of both his
109 See DaSilva, O'Brien v. O'Brien Reviewed By the Doctor's Attorney, New York L.J.,
Jan. 27, 1986, at 1, col. 3. Willard DaSilva, attorney for Michael O'Brien, took exception with the O'Brien court's opinion that analogized projecting future potential
earnings of a professional to computations made in personal injury, wrongful
death, and medical malpractice actions. Id. at 4, col. 3. There is, cautioned DaSilva, a major hazard overshadowing a "guesstimate" made of an individual's future earnings that does not burden defendants in cases where tort damages are
based on estimated calculations. Id. DaSilva stated that the issue of who must absorb the loss becomes critical when considering the following:
In tort actions, there is usually an insurance fund which is available to
pay claims based upon the anticipated lost earnings of the injured party.
If a mistake is made by overestimating lost earnings, the fund is depleted a little more rapidly. As the fund becomes depleted, the insurance company is in a position to, and does, increase its premiums to
spread the risk over many thousands of policyholders who replenish the
fund. The insurance company loses no money because it has a means to
recoup its losses based upon the higher claims being paid. On the other
hand, Dr. O'Brien, or anyone similarly situated, would have no recourse
if there has been an overestimation of his future earnings. He has no
fund of money which can be replenished by others. He either earns
what the trial judge anticipates he would earn, or he is in trouble, with
no way to alter the determination or to pass the losses onto anyone else.
Id.
110 Id.
I I I See id. at 4, col. 2-4.
112 O'Brien, 66 N.Y.2d at 591, 489 N.E.2d at 702, 498 N.Y.S.2d at 751 (Meyer,J.,
concurring).

1987]

NOTES

979

education and marriage coincide. The Domestic Relations Law
classifies marital property as "all property acquired... before the
execution of a separation agreement or the commencement of a
matrimonial action. ' 3 Therefore, a shrewd professional facing
graduation and divorce concurrently may avoid having his license
included as marital property simply by orchestrating the commencement of the divorce action so that the license is obtained
l 4
after the date of filing."
Another area of potential inequity involves the situation
where a professional practice has developed over time to some
degree of profitability. A problem arises in determining when
the non title-holding spouse is entitled to a share of both the professional practice as well as the license itself. The facts of O'Brien
do not lend themselves to an examination of this issue. Consequently, it remains unclear at what point the courts should
render a professional license irrelevant for distribution purposes
where a profitable professional practice, utilizing the potential of
the professional license itself, has been developed.
The O'Brien decision unquestionably has stirred a host of
unexplored problems relative to valuation of marital assets, actual spouse contribution, award modification and countless other
delicate marital issues. The New York Court of Appeals, however, has resolved the critical issue that a professional license to
practice medicine acquired during marriage may be considered
marital property subject to equitable distribution in accordance
with New York's revised Domestic Relations Law.' 15 Though future litigation will resolve the many crucial ancillary issues necessary to create a truly equitable approach to such apportionment
of assets, the momentous issue has clearly been determined.
Despite its seemingly radical overtones, the O'Brien decision
represents a distinctly conventional view of the marital institution. This is demonstrated by the New York Court of Appeals'
genuine respect for both parties' interests and its commitment
toward facilitating the partnership aspects of the couple's marriage.'6 The O'Brien decision balances both tangible and intan-

gible contributions of either spouse toward the realization of that
which was launched as a common goal: the acquisition of a pro113 See supra note 28 (definition of marital property).
114 DaSilva, supra note 109, at 4, col. 2.
115 O'Brien, 66 N.Y.2d at 580-81, 489 N.E.2d at 713, 498 N.Y.S.2d at 744.
116 See id. at 585, 489 N.E.2d at 716, 498 N.Y.S.2d at 747.
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fessional license." 7 Loretta O'Brien was not merely reimbursed
for her monetary contributions to Michael's medical education.
Rather, she was awarded an equitable portion of the asset generated as a direct result of her varied efforts and sacrifices towards
its attainment."' Michael and Loretta O'Brien were deemed
"business partners," an arrangement which dictates that upon
dissolution of their partnership, each shall retain an equitable
share of the assets acquired-not simply collect the value of services rendered. Thus, the O'Brien decision obviates the loss of esteem that the working spouse faces as a result of being relegated
"to the role of an alternative to a student loan"" 9 and counteracts calamitous regrets due to forfeited opportunities.
Stephanie Rubino
117 See Skoloff, A Second Look At Professional Degrees: Are They Now MaritalProperty?,
Nat'l L. J., April 7, 1986, at 28, col. 3. Gary Skoloff commented that the O'Brien
court's treatment of a professional license as marital property
appears to be the correct approach where it is limited to the career
threshold spouse. Where there are no assets available for equitable distribution, treatment of the professional degree as property seems the
only remedy that adequately compensates the supporting spouse and
allows the wage-earner spouse to reap the fruits of their investment.
The result comports with the original expectations of both parties, since
the usual testimony results around a collective decision that one of them
should pursue a particular career goal so both will benefit in the future.
Id. at 29, col.l.
118 O'Brien, 66 N.Y.2d at 585-86, 489 N.E.2d at 716, 485 N.Y.S.2d at 747.
119 O'Brien, 106 A.D.2d at 239, 485 N.Y.S.2d at 559 (Thompson, J.P., concurring
in part and dissenting in part).

